The authors describe the value of routine serological surveillance in detecting the introduction of classical swine fever virus into a disease-free population. The first investigation concerned the question of whether the epidemic of classical swine fever (CSF), which occurred from 1997 to 1998 in the Netherlands, could have been detected using the existing monitoring system for notifiable diseases. The investigation used data from the CSF epidemic of 1997/1998 and from the existing monitoring system. Secondly, the probability of detecting a case of CSF using routine serological surveillance was modelled both for multiplier herds and for finishing herds, and then for different herd size categories. The first investigation concluded that the probability of detecting the epidemic at the current level of routine serological surveillance is very low. The second investigation concluded that even employing a sampling scheme of sixty blood samples per month, the probability of detecting an outbreak of CSF within forty days of the introduction of the virus, is less than 40%.
Introduction
After the introduction of classical swine fever (CSF) virus into a country, some time will elapse before the disease is detected. from three weeks to nine weeks. In 60% of the epidemics, the HRP1 was five weeks or more (3, 13) . In the [1997] [1998] epidemic of CSF in the Netherlands, the first infected herd was detected on 4 February 1997, approximately six weeks after infection. An additional thirty-five herds were estimated to have become infected during the HRP1 of which, fourteen herds were due to trade on 4 February 1997 or on the previous day (11) In the present study, the authors examine the question of whether routine serological surveillance is a useful tool for the reduction of the HRP1 of CSF. Firstly, the authors investigate the probability that the epidemic of CSF in the Netherlands in 1997/1998 would have been detected earlier by use of the blood samples collected within the framework of the HDC regulation. Secondly, in a modelling study, the usefulness of serological surveillance for early warning of CSF is examined in a more general context. -multiplier herds (producers of breeding stock or finishing piglets)
-finishing herds (producers of fatteners)
-mixed herds (a combination of multiplier and finishing herds).
Materials and methods

The herd disease control regulation
Within the framework of the HDC regulation, all swine herds (except herds of less than five animals) are clinically inspected by a veterinarian every four months. In addition, blood samples are collected and tested for antibodies to SVD virus.
In multiplier herds, the nurrrber of samples taken is proportional to herd size based on the sows present. In fattening or rearing herds, samples are taken in proportion to herd size and in as many compartments as possible, with an optimum of one pig per pen. In mixed herds, only sows are sampled. The herd sampling was based on a hypergeometric distribution and a 95% probability of finding at least one seropositive animal if 25% or more of the animals in the herd are seropositive for SVD (6) . Table I shows the number of samples collected in the framework of this regulation for different herd size categories.
Because of the similarity between finishing and rearing herds in terms of production systems and housing, rearing herds (rearing of replacement gilts) were treated as finishing herds.
Serological tests
Serum derived from all blood samples collected before depopulation was tested for antibodies against CSF virus in an enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) (1) . To ensure that the serological testing was CSF-specific, samples that twice showed an inhibition of 30% or over were retested in the neutralising peroxidase-linked assay (14) , using CSF strain Brescia and border disease virus strain F and/or bovine virus diarrhoea virus strain Oregon. The time from collection of the sample until notification of the test results was approximately six days. The probability that a pig is seropositive, as a function of time t, since infection with the combination of the two serological tests, has been described as (12) :
A graphie reproduction of this function is shown in Figure 1 .
The specificity of the combined tests was assumed to be 1.
Fig. 1
Time-dependent cumulative probability curve for detection of a seropositive pig using combined serological tests
Analysis of data
The equations used for different processes are explained
below.
An epidemic was denoted as detected if at least one infected herd was detected. The probability of detecting the epidemic depended on the herd-level sensitivity (HSE) of each herd1 which became infected during the HRP1 and could be The growth rate parameter r could be estimated as follows (10) :
where:
PÇdetecting épidémie) = the probability of detecting the epidemic, HSE = herd-level sensitivity (the probability of a truly infected herd being classified as infected by a test based on a random sample of animals) (9), and
(1 -HSE1) = the probability that each herdf is not detected.
A herd was denoted as positive if at least one pig was tested positive. The equation for herd-level sensitivity is as follows (9):
where: Analysis of the probability of detecting the 1997-1998 epidemic of classical swine fever using blood samples collected within the framework of the herd disease control regulation [3] The growth rate parameter of each individual herd that became infected during the HRP1 was estimated by substituting the observed seroprevalence at depopulation and the time between infection and depopulation into equation [4] , assuming one introduction at t = 0. Then, by [5] replacing the time between infection and depopulation in equation [4] with the time between infection and HDC sampling, and using the previous estimated growth rate parameter, the seroprevalence at HDC sampling for that particular herd was estimated. Equation [3] was then used to estimate the herd-level sensitivity for each individual herd on the day of HDC sampling. Finally, equation [2] was used to estimate the probability of detecting the epidemic by testing the HDC samples for antibodies to CSF virus.
Modelling the herd-level sensitivity for detecting classical swine fever by serological surveillance
For regular routine surveillance, the probability of a herd being first visited at day t after infection is independent of the date of virus introduction and has a uniform distribution as follows: [6] where:
P(visi£( ( p = the probability of a herd being visited at day £ after infection, and AT = the average time (in days) between two HDC visits.
The herd-level sensitivities for different sampling schemes were modelled for the first sixty days post infection according to the sampling schemes given in Table II . With a four monthly sampling scheme, the probability that the herd would be found to be positive if tested on or before t days post infection is as follows: [7] where:
Q( t ) = the probability that the herd was detected on or before t days post infection, and
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With a monthly sampling scheme, a herd would be visited twice over a period of sixty days, assuming a second visit thirty days after the first visit. For the first thirty days, the probability that the herd would be found positive on or before t days post infection could be calculated using equation [7] , replacing 121 by 30. However, for the next thirty days, this probability also depends on the probability of not detecting the herd at the first visit:
2(0 = ÍÉ¿Vorl<t<30, and
Laevens et al. estimated RQ for finishing herds to be 13.5 (8).
Stegeman et al. estimated R0 for multiplier herds to be 2.9 and T& in general to be 10 (12). Furthermore, I0 was always assumed to be 1. In consequence, equation [4] became either:
S(¡) = e°" 106( ' 185 ' for multiplier herds, or S(tj = e°' 260( 1 185) for finishing herds.
The number of seropositive pigs per day post infection was estimated by using these equations. For each sampling scheme the herd-level sensitivity at day £ post infection was calculated by substituting the corresponding seroprevalence and sample size in equation [3] . Finally, the cumulative probability of detecting a positive herd on or before t days post infection was calculated by using equation [7] for each four monthly sampling scheme and equation [8] for each monthly sampling scheme.
Results
Probability of detecting the 1997-1998 epidemic of classical swine fever using the blood samples collected within the framework of the herd disease control regulation
In the epidemic of 1997-1998 in the Netherlands, twenty-one herds became infected with CSF virus before 4 February 1997. Within this group, the estimated time until detection varied from fifteen days to forty-five days. Before the infected herds were depopulated, blood samples were collected from fifteen herds and examined for antibodies against CSF virus (Table III) . Total number of herds 6 15 Blood samples were collected from five herds within the HKPl for the HDC regulation. From four of these five herds, the HDC blood samples were collected within ten days of the estimated date of infection (Table IV) . Given a time lag of 18.5 days to allow for the formation of antibodies, the probability of the presence of a seropositive pig in a herd within ten days of infection can be ignored (equation [4] ).
The combined probability of detecting the epidemic, based on the herd-level sensitivity of the five herds which were sampled within the HRP1, was estimated to be 0.39. This probability (Table IV) .
Modelling the probability of detecting an epidemic of classical swine fever at an early stage by serological surveillance
The cumulative probability functions for detecting an infected herd within t days post infection, for the different sampling schemes, are illustrated in Figure 2 for multiplier herds and in Figure 3 for finishing herds.
In the first part of the curves, the cumulative probability of detecting an infected herd is influenced by the herd-level sensitivity. When the herd-level sensitivity becomes one, this cumulative probability depends only on the timing of the sampling (number of days post infection).
Taking into account the time needed for notification of the test results (approximately six days), the cumulative probabilities of detecting an infected herd within forty days post infection was less then 0.40 for all sampling schemes.
With a sample size of sixty blood samples every four months, these cumulative probabilities were still beneath 0.25 after sixty days.
Discussion
The probability of detecting the 1997-1998 epidemic of CSF in the Netherlands using the blood samples collected within the framework of the HDC regulation was estimated to be 0.39. Although this probability depended entirely on the probability of detecting herd 'A', detection of the epidemic could have occurred no more than two days earlier. On 
Fig.2 Time-dependent cumulative probability functions for détection of an infected multiplier herd during the first sixty days post infection, using serological surveillance
The function is illustrated in respect to herd-level sensitivity and herd and sample size catégories with a monthly or a four-monthly sampling scheme and assuming a reproduction ratio (fl 0 ) of 2.9. The curves cover the first sixty days post infection and are based on two visits in a monthly scheme with a period of thirty days between the two visits, and on one visit in a four-monthly scheme 5 February, the day after détection of the épidémie, the twelve HDC blood samples of herd 'A', collected on 27 January 1997, were tested for antibodies to CSF virus, and ail tested négative. Consequently, die conclusion reached by the authors, that the épidémie would not hâve been detected by serological screening if the HDC blood samples were examined for antibodies directed against CSF virus, is justified.
Data conceming the first outbreaks were not always available or complète. The date used as the most likely infection date was that stated by the départaient of epidemiology of the disease control centre. However, thèse were often estimations frorn a range of possible infection dates. In the hectic first days after détection of the épidémie, six herds were not serologically examined at dépopulation. Thèse six herds also received no visit under the HDC régulation within the HRP-L, which means that thèse herds could not possibly hâve contributed to the probability of detecting the épidémie.
With a herd-level sensitivity of 0.39 (herd 'A'), the probability of not detecting a truly infected herd is 0.61. The results of examination of the blood samples of herd 'A' were in accordance with the estimated herd-level sensitivity on the day of the HDC visit.
Modelling the probability of detecting classical swine fever at an early stage by serological surveillance
The cumulative probabilities of detecting an infected herd by routine serological surveillance within forty days of the introduction of the virus into a herd, appeared to be beneath 0.40 for ail tested sampling schemes, even if a monthly sampling scheme with sixty blood samples was acconiplished. Therefore, routine serological surveillance as an early détection System for classical swine fever does not appear appropriate.
The most critical reason for this failure is the low level of infected pigs at the early stage of an outbreak. Furthermore, a number of days must pass before the level of antibodies is at a sufficiently high level to be reliably detected by the serological tests (équation [1] ), Eflectively, équation [4] is the number of infected pigs, with a time kg of 18.5 days to allow for the Time-dependent cumulative probability functions for détection of an infected finishing herd during the first sixty days post infection, using serological surveillance
The function is illustrated in respect to herd-level sensitivity and herd and sample size catégories with a monthly or a four-monthly sampling scheme and assuming a reproduction ratio (Ho) of 13.5. The curves cover the first sixty days post infection and are based on two visits in a monthly scheme with a period of thirty days between the two visits, and on one visit in a four monthly scheme formation of antibodies. In the best case, CSF could be detected by serological screening approximately twenty-five days after introduction of the virus into the herd, if the first infected pigs were part of the sampling and if the time needed for notification of the test results (approximately six days) was taken into account.
The number of infected pigs at day t after introduction of the virus into the herd dépends on the number of introductions, I o , at t = 0, the reproduction ratio, R o , and the génération interval of ten days (équations [4] and [5] ).
The value of I o dépends on how the virus is introduced into a herd. I o could correspond to a large proportion of the herd if the cause of the infection was, for example, swill feeding, in which many pigs might be infected simultaneously. This would increase the probability of early détection by serological surveillance because the number of séropositive animais from the eighteenth day would be fairly large. However, swill feeding is illégal in the Netherlands.
The génération interval was estimated from the CSF épidémie in 1997-1998, to be equal to ten days (12) . The reproduction ratio, RQ, for multiplier herds was also estimated from that épidémie, which was caused by the CSF Paderborn strain (12) . The reproduction ratio, R o , for finishing herds was estimated from an expérimental infection of finishing pigs with the CSF Lorraine strain (8) . Both strains are believed to be moderately virulent strains. In an épidémie of CSF caused by a CSF strain of low virulence, clinical signs of the infection will be less obvious. In this case, serological testing of blood samples could be helpful. If serological évidence can be observed in advance of clinical signs then routine serological surveillance should provide an effective method of detecting the épidémie. However, based on the results of the current study, routine serological surveillance could never lead to a short HRPj.
For the twelve blood samples of the HDC régulation, a seroprevalence of 0.25 could be detected with a 95% probability. Because the purpose of this study was to investigate the probabilities of earlier detection of an infected herd through serological surveillance, a sample size of sixty blood samples was also investigated. Using sixty blood samples, a seroprevalence of 0.05 could be detected with a 95% probability (9) .
In estimating the probabilities of detecting CSF by serological surveillance, the herds that were sampled were assumed to be homogeneous. This means that only one type of susceptible pig and only one type of infectious pig were present in the herd. The authors also assumed that these types of pig could only be sows or finishing pigs. The presence of suckling or weaned piglets in multiplier herds was not considered. and consequently to an overestimation of the probability of detecting an infected herd. Therefore, the estimated probabilities must be seen as best-case probabilities, because of the necessary assumptions.
The reproduction ratios that were used for finishing herds in this model were estimates from a single experiment and a single epidemic, both with a moderately virulent virus strain.
According to the reported high-risk periods of recent epidemics of CSF in Europe, most of the epidemics seemed to be caused by moderately virulent virus strains. Therefore, for most epidemics, the conclusion that routine serological surveillance is inappropriate as an early detecting system for CSF seems to be justified.
General discussion
The general conclusion of this study is that routine serological surveillance would not have contributed to the detection of the 1997-1998 CSF epidemic in the Netherlands, and would probably have little value in detecting an outbreak of CSF.
However, these conclusions concern the detection of a first
outbreak. The value of routine serological screening is to confirm that no unnoticed outbreaks have occurred.
Although important, this application of serological surveillance is beyond the scope of this paper and will not be further discussed.
The 
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Resumen
Los autores evalúan la eficacia de la vigilancia serológica sistemática para detectar la penetración del virus de la peste porcina clásica en una población libre de la enfermedad. En una primera investigación se trató de determinar en qué medida la epizootia de peste porcina clásica que sufrieron los Países Bajos entre 1997 y 1998 podía haberse detectado mediante el sistema vigente de monitoreo de enfermedades de declaración obligatoria. Para ello se utilizaron los datos de aquella epidemia y del sistema de monitoreo. Después se construyó un modelo para estimar la probabilidad de detectar un caso de peste porcina clásica mediante procedimientos de vigilancia serológica sistemática, en rebaños de multiplicación como de engorde, y en rebaños de distintos tamaños. De la primera investigación se infirió que, con el nivel actual de vigilancia serológica, la probabilidad de detectar la epizootia era muy baja. La segunda investigación concluyó que, aun utilizando un programa de muestreo de sesenta muestras sanguíneas mensuales, la probabilidad de detectar un brote de peste porcina clásica en los cuarenta días siguientes a la introducción del virus era inferior a un 40%.
